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Abstract 
This paper is an essay on ways of using auction as a mechanism for optimizing price settings. Auction theory 
is relevant for optimizing revenue in markets for private and common value goods. The paper is applying 
auction theory on auctions for fishing quotes. The benchmark analysis conducted on the auction markets is 
based on the principles of maximizing the revenue in auction based on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
(RET), which is central for designing optimal auctions. Dissolving some of the assumptions of the (RET) is a 
presumption to benchmarking different auction mechanisms under different market conditions. This paper 
discusses how auction theory might be used for analyzing markets for Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ). 
Key words: Pricing, Revenue Equivalence Theorem, auctions over fishing rights. 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose and focus of the paper is to explain which auction mechanisms that gives the highest revenue 
of fishing rights. The resource rent gives an opportunity to secure another allocation of what could be a 
common good than today, without having an effect on the development towards an economically optimal 
fishery. Benchmarking of auction markets is founded on (RET)2.  The benchmark model says, given 
assumptions of risk neutrality, symmetry and independent private values,  
“then different auction forms yield the same expected revenue, and also allows revenue ranking of auctions 
to be developed when these assumptions are violated” (Klemperer 2004, 77).  
The common fish resources are under pressure and policy makers have in some countries, for example in 
Denmark, introduced individual transferable quotes (ITQ) for securing a market based allocation of 
resource among fishermen. However, a proper designed auction system goes hand in hand with securing 
the highest revenue and obtaining efficiency in the fishing fleet. In a grand fathering system (administrative 
decision, giving the quotas away for free the resource rent is obtained by the fishermen ) , while in a system 
were the public authority owns the rights over the TAC and auctioning those rights away, the public 
authority and thereby the society obtains the resource rent. Today the most common system is the grand 
fathering, where the objective is to maximize fishermens profit.   Allocating government-owned fishing 
rights through an auction, the objective is to maximize the revenue because we want to maximize tax 
revenue. 
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The outline of the paper is as follow. In the following section is given an introduction of auction theory is 
made. Concepts and definitions are set place. In section 3 the theory is used for describing the optimal 
auction design based on the specific conditions characterizing the buyers (vessel owners) in ITQ’s. In 
section 4 there is a discussion of thoughts of entry, collusion, size and time limitations of quotas, which is 
closely linked to the focus in this paper. Finally in section 5 a conclusion is made. 
2. Auction theory 
An auction is a market mechanism with a set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the 
basis of bids from the market participants. The auction market is characterized by only having one seller 
and the auction theory goes on explaining ways for the seller to maximize market revenue.     
The benchmarking is conducted based on the four auction types; English, Dutch, first sealed bid auction and 
second sealed bid auction (Philps 1988). The four standard mechanisms organization is explained. A 
mechanism is understood as rules for economic activity, meaning rules for how the agents react to 
different input, that is needed to be designed for example that the seller obtain the highest possible 
revenue. The outcome depends on the information of the agents (buyers and sellers) has. The auction 
mechanism used for obtaining the highest revenue depends on specific assumptions of the (RET). The 
benchmarking is done by dissolving (RET) assumptions, and then look at which of the auction mechanisms 
which generate the highest revenue. 
The four standard auction types 
The English auction type is based on the auctioneer setting a price of goods at a low level, then the buyers 
are given competing bids, which are rising in price to the price break. The auction ends when there is one 
buyer left and the final price is the remaining buyer's last bid. The essential feature of the English auction is 
that, at any point in time, each bidder knows the level of the current best bid.  
The Dutch auction type is the opposite of the English. It is obtained by the auctioneer setting a high price 
for the goods, which is the stating price that price is higher than the price the buyers are willing to pay. 
Then the auctioneer lowers the price until the first of the competing buyers accept the auction bid.  
In a first-price sealed-bid auction, potential buyers bid on the good by placing their bid in a sealed 
envelope. Whoever, has the highest bid wins the good and pay the price he has bid. The basic difference 
between the first price sealed bid auction and the English auction is that in the English auction, bidders are 
able to observe their rivals bids, whereas in the first sealed bid auction can if they choose, revise their own 
bids. In sealed bid auction one only submit one bid.  
Second-price sealed-bid auctions are auctions with the same procedure as in first-price sealed-bid auction, 
and the winner of the good remains the buyer with the highest bid. The difference is that the winner only 
has to pay the amount equal to the second highest bid for the goods.  
A benchmarking of the four auctions is founded on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), which outline 
under which conditions the four auctions types gives the same price (Vickrey, 1961).  
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The definition of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) is: 
“Assume each of n risk-neutral potential buyers has a privately known value3 independently drawn from a 
common distribution F(v) that is strictly increasing and atomless on ],[ vv 4. Suppose that no buyer wants 
more than one of the k5 available identical indivisible objects. Then any auction  mechanism in which (i) the 
objects always goes to the k buyers with the highest values, and (ii) any bidder with value v  expects zero 
surplus, yields the same expected revenue, and results in a buyer with value v making the same expected 
payment”. (Klemperer 2004, 42) 
The (RET) says, given the assumptions hold, then it doesn’t matter which of the four standard auction 
mechanisms are used to obtain the highest price as possible. But when some of the assumptions are not 
fulfilled, then one of mechanism is preferred over another that is, one mechanism is gives a higher revenue 
than the other auction mechanisms.  
The (RET) applies both to private value models (in which the bidders value depends only on his own signal) 
and in common value models provided that bidders’ signals are independent (Klemperer 2004). 
The assumptions behind (RET) are: 
a) A single seller6 with reservation value  faces n potential buyers, where buyer i  holds reservation 
value , i = 1,…..,n. 
b) The reservation values7 of the parties are independent and identically distributed, drawn from the 
common distribution8  with ,  and  strictly increasing and 
differentiable over the interval , .  
c) The agents are risk-neutral9,10. 
 (Riley et al 1981, 381) 
Besides these assumptions, it is assumed that in order to maximize revenue, then free entry and no 
collusion is an assumption. Further there exist uncertainties among buyers what the other buyers are 
willing to pay. 
Uncertainty and auctions 
In the auction market there is either private or common values. In the private-value model every buyer 
knows what the good is worth to them, but the buyer's valuation is private information, this means that the 
buyers cannot observe the valuation of the other buyers. Each buyer obtain the uncertainty that they do 
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not know the highest bid that the other buyers are willing to give.  A painting is a good example. In the 
common-value model, the value of the good is the same for all competing buyers. The uncertainty is based 
on that the buyer doesn’t know the real value of the good. There is imperfect information of the value of 
the good, and each buyer has received an individual signal of the value, but the price signal is imperfect. 
This implies that the buyers are willing to follow a bidding strategy to bid what they think is a great 
likelihood what the other will bid, and they tend to over bid, this phenomenon is called the winners curse, 
meaning that they have paid more than the actual value. For example, the value of the rights to drill for oil 
depends on how much oil there is in the underground, and buyers may have access to different geological 
"signals" (these signals are distributed uniform) on this volume. In practice does the "pure common" model 
not exist, since the information differs among buyers. This is the so-called "true value",  it is marginally 
different from buyer to buyer. There exist, a private-value component of the model. This is called the 
“almost common-value” model (Klemperer 1998). 
3. Auctions used to allocate ITQ’s 
In the following it is discussed which assumptions funding the (RET) is most likely being found in markets 
for fish quotas. When one of these assumptions behind (RET) are not fulfilled, it is discussed which of the 
four standard mechanisms that maximizes revenue.  
Dissolving of the (RET) assumptions, and preferred standard mechanisms 
While both theoretical and applied economic literature on auctions is rich, studies of auctions over ITQ’s 
are few. Nevertheless some papers have been made. Armstrong (2000) and Morgan (1995) discuss what 
happens when relaxing some of the assumptions in the (RET), and compares the different auction 
mechanisms.  
Common values: The fishermen are uncertain what the true value of the ITQ’s are but have private signals 
about this. Therefore, they are not sure what the actual value of the ITQ is worth to them. How does this 
affect prices in different auction mechanisms? In a sealed bid auction each bidder makes its own estimate 
of the true value of the good. The bidder who wins, is the bidder with the highest reservation value11. This 
means that all other bidders estimated value is lower. In a common value model, the winner's curse 
phenomenon arises. Winners curse means that the winning bidder has overestimated the true value of the 
good. A rational bidder in a common value sealed bid auction who wants to avoid becoming a victim of 
winner's curse, does this by believing that his own estimate of the good's value is higher than any other 
bidders. By believing that he is the winner, he sets his bid equal to what he estimates to be the second 
highest valuation, given that all other bidders make the same presumption. Thus, this same approach offers 
the English auction. So it makes no difference what kind of good it is. Therefore, one mechanism is not 
preferred over another (McAfee et al 1987), which is expressed in table 1 by outlining that the seller is 
indifferent in choosing between the four standard auction mechanisms, because all of them gives the same 
auction revenue.  
It is more likely that bidders have affiliated values, that is, if a bidder believes the good for sale has a certain 
value, there is a substantial likelihood that other bidders have the same assessment. The English auction 
reveals information about the bidders for other bidders, which gives less information rent or asymmetry 
between bidders. This extra information reduces the risk of winner's curse, leading to more aggressive bids, 
leading to higher revenues. Therefore, the English auction mechanism is preferred from the seller's 
standpoint, if affiliated values are present (table 1). 
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Risk-aversion: Buyers are risk-averse12 where quota values are very high or when fluctuations of the fish 
stocks on an annual basis are large. Another argument is that the buyers of quotas (vessels owners) are risk 
averse follows due to the non-malleability of capital, leaving the vessel owners with only few options for 
buying quotas in other markets transferring the harvesting outside the national borders.  Revenue tends to 
be larger in a first sealed price auction than in an English or second-price auction. This follows because 
“But in a first-price auction, a slight increase in a players bid slightly increases her probability of winning at 
the cost of slightly reducing the value of winning, so would be desirable for a risk-averse bidder if the 
current bidding level were optimal for a risk-neutral bidder. So risk-aversion makes bidders bid more 
aggressively in first price auctions. Therefore, since the standard auctions were revenue equivalent with risk-
neutral bidders, a risk neutral seller faced by risk-averse bidders prefers the first price auction to second 
price sealed bid or ascending auctions.” (Klemperer 2004, 19) 
A feature of bidding in auctions with risk aversion and a common-value goods, is the winners curse. The risk 
of winners curse is less than in an open auction. There exist a tradeoff between revenues and avoidance of 
winners curse. However, one can choose to make multiple rounds of sealed bid auctions, with the bids 
announced after a round, but not bidder identity.  See table 1. 
 
Asymmetry: Asymmetry is defined as observable differences between the bidders.  In the ITQ case, it’s a 
reasonable assumption to make that different fleet segments are asymmetric alia in their cost structure. 
See table 1. Given asymmetry exist, it implies that the conditions for (RET) is violated. The effect of pricing 
in  different auction mechanisms is uncertain.“Roughly speaking, the sealed-bid auction generates more 
revenue than the open auction when bidders have distributions with the same shape (but different 
supports), whereas the open auction dominates when, across bidders, distributions have different shapes 
but approximately the same support” (Maskin et al 1985,154). 
 
 
Table 1 shows the assumptions behind the (RET). It is also about whether these assumptions are met in and 
auctions of ITQ's. The consequence is given by specifying which mechanism is preferable under the 
different assumptions. 
 
Table 1. Preferred auction mechanisms by the seller if ITQ’s are auctioned  
Auctions over ITQ’s Independent private values No affliated values Risk-neutrality Symmetry 
(RET) No Yes No No  
The (RET) is violated No Yes Yes Yes 
Preferred mechanism from sellers point of view Indifferent English auction 1. sealed bid Depends on 
bidders 
distribution 
 
There is no absolute answer to the question of which auction mechanism that provides the highest 
revenue. As table 1 show, it depends on the fishery in question. Which of the assumptions of the (RET) are 
fulfilled. Morgan (1995) indirectly says that ITQ’s are a common-value good, by writing about the winners 
curse.  If one of the assumptions behind (RET) is not fulfilled, table 1 shows which mechanism is preferred 
when dissolving the assumptions behind the (RET) one by one.  Other elements of importance are 
conditions of entry and collusion, which is discussed in further detail in the following section.  
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4. Discussion and related thoughts about ITQ’s 
The revenue in the auction market is depending on the entry of newcomers and collusion. The entry is 
based on the ability of attracting newcomers into the market. Collusion is based on an agreement between 
bidders not to bid or bid low, which causes low revenue. Therefore these issues are important when the 
policy objective is to maximize revenue (Morgan 1995) (Bromley 2005). Furthermore the size and maturity 
of quotas are important, because it has to fit into the existing fishing fleet, while an immediately change in 
the fishing fleet is not practical. 
Entry  
Entry are important because as Klemperer (2004, 27) writes 
“so it is typically worthwhile for a seller to devote more resources to expanding the market than to 
collecting the information and performing the calculations required to figure out the best mechanism”  
One more additional bidder means that the revenue of the auction will rise. Therefore one has to look at 
what attract new bidders. Entry is also important securing the efficiency in fishing fleet. 
Jensen et al (2005) discusses whether an auction over the Greenlandic shrimp fishery can achieve the policy 
object in terms of revenue maximization, when it is not realistic with new entry. The conclusion is that it 
becomes difficult to achieve. New entry is not realistic because of the dominant position on the market the 
two agents Royal Greenland (government owned) and Polar Seafood Greenland have. Another example of 
limited entry is seen in Estonian quota market (Vetemaa et al, 2002). The number and amount of quotas in 
auctions of the 10% of all Estonian fishing rights were settled by an auction committee. The fishery record 
was auctioning "open outcry"(English auction) of rising prices. In contrast of an English auction, in a first 
sealed bid auction, a weaker bidder may win at a price that the stronger bidder could have beaten and 
thereby, encouraged new entry. Each year, only one general auction was held over the Estonian open sea 
fishing (Vetemaa et al 2002). The auction mechanism offers two significant advantages. First, the process is 
efficient in that sense that it identifies the market demand and appropriate “price” for quotas. Second, the 
process identifies those potential users of the resource with the highest valuation for those fishing rights 
which are set for sale. This statement is tested in the paper of Eero et al (2005). They test the efficiency of 
different fleet segments in the year of 2001, where the Estonian auction system over ITQ’s still was 
effective. The results of the quota auctions and their impact on the fleet structure are as follows. The 
results of the auction system, is similar as the ITQ systems in some other countries. First, the quota share of 
larger vessels has increased. Second, the concentration of auctioned quota to more efficient vessels has 
created the preconditions for eventual disappearance of less efficient vessels. The continuation of the 
auction system would probably have accelerated the process towards a more efficient fleet.  
 
Collusion is important because it lowers the revenue due to weak competition among bidders. In an 
oligopolistic competition situation, where a homogenous good is produced, the threat of a future price war 
will be enough to encourage the single firm to take the monopoly price, instead of a reduction in price. 
Oligopolists are then able to cooperate without talking to each other. Firms have an incentive to collude if 
they: First, can identify an efficient dividing of the market. Second, can agree on a division of the market. 
Third, if drops from the agreement are easily discovered. Fourth, that punishing such a drop can be done 
with a great deal of credibility. Last, that firms scare firms that is not part of the collusion, from enter the 
market (Klemperer 1999). The choice between open or closed bid depends on the context. The advantage 
of the open auctions is that they do competitors valuation ratios of the quota for sale, available 
immediately. The bidders are more secure and offer higher and thus more revenue than a sealed bid 
auction. The exception to this is, when bidders are risk averse. Risk aversion exists when quota values are 
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very high, or fish from year to year varies greatly. Open auctions also has it flaws. For example, it is weak 
against collusion, which can lead to monopolistic practices, and hence lower quota prices. Collusion risk can 
be combated in a sealed bid auction. This leads usually to lower revenue because the bidders are trying to 
avoid winner's curse. This tradeoff between high revenue and the avoidance of collusion can be avoided by 
multiple rounds of sealed bid auctions. The next question is whether the auction should be a first, or a 
second price auction. In the first price sealed bid, there is a risk of winner's curse, so the winner will not be 
able to use quotas revenue. To protect against winner's curse, you can use the second price auction 
mechanism. An alternative to solving the winner's curse, is a one-price auction, where bids are accepted 
simultaneously. However, one design is not a good design in all situations. A practical example of collusion 
was the fish quota auctions in Estonia, held in 2001 and 2002. 2001 was a success regarding revenue 
maximizing. But in 2002 the fishermen managed to make an agreement, which caused the auction to break 
down. Later that year another auction was held over some quotas which was “leftovers”, and this time 
there was competing bidding, meaning that the fishermen agreement was broken. In 2003 the agreement 
between the fishermen consisted. And this was the end of the auction system in Estonia. 
 
Size of quotas, matching the fleet capacity  
The size of quotas matters when maximizing revenue, because a rapid change in fleet capacity in response 
to changes in the quota market is undesirable and not practical. If the quotas are too small it’s not efficient 
to a large vessel to bid, otherwise if the quota is to big then capital cost can achieve the benefits of owning 
a quota, then again no vessel owner will bid. While simultaneous auctions of quota units are preferred, in 
order to achieve a match between the quota and fleet capacity. Such auctions with multiple rounds of 
sealed bids, the bidders ability to use information disclosed during the bidding process, makes it easier to 
design unit aggregations to match capacity. This will affect investment decisions (Morgan 1995). 
 
Time limited individual quotas (ISQ) versus ITQ’s  
Exchange of quotas in the auctions will generate revenue, the actual resource rate that the fishermen are 
willing to pay to the quota owners. Owners may be the government, fishing communities, etc. The 
competition for quota among fishermen provides an incentive to improve efficiency and thus increase the 
margin between cost and market value. Shortcomings in a free market auction of the limited TAC might be 
that the social costs may be higher than what is politically acceptable. Governments role is to establish 
rules that enhance the free market and prevent monopoly (Trondsen 2002). ITQ's are auctioned to last 
long. 
 
ISQ (Individual seasonal quotas), fits better into the fishermen’s planning horizon. Uncertainty characterizes 
fisheries and fishermen's planning horizon, it tends to be short term. As in ITQ's will ISQ system give 
fishermen and fishing firms an incentive to be competitive within the regulatory framework. It is in the 
fishermen’s own interest to minimize their overcapacity. Each season the ISQ’s are auctioned, otherwise 
ITQ's are auctioned only once. Beside it gives the fishermen a better opportunity to plan, other advantage 
of the ISQ is that, compared with ITQ, it could attract some newcomers as it does not require as much 
capital, and then prices of quotas are raised. But the risk of "deep pockets" exists. The risk is that capital-
strong buyers buy quotas in order to eliminate competitors and to reduce future competition. This type of 
behavior can be minimized if fishermen get credit (Trondsen 2002). But the risk of this behavior is ceteris 
paribus higher in ITQ system than in ISQ system. Another weakness of the ITQ system is its ability to 
assemble all of the future resource rent. It is difficult to make real long-term projections of future quota 
value. This is much easier in ISQ system. In an ITQ system, the trade in allowances on the secondary market 
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may not give the resource interest to the community, but for fishermen and fishing firms, this may be a 
problem in allocation policy, and not meet the society's object function. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has  discussed some of the existing literature on the subject of auctions on fishing rights. The 
central theorem in auction theory is the (RET), in this paper the assumptions of the (RET) has been 
dissolved. The conclusion is that the (RET) does not hold. This implies that one auction mechanism can be 
preferred over another when the (RET) assumptions are dissolved one by one. 
In addition to the theoretical concerns, what really matters in good auction design, besides the (RET) 
assumptions, are issues such as collusion and entry. 
It has been shown by benchmarking different auction mechanisms, when one of the assumptions of (RET) is 
dissolved, then one mechanism can be preferred over another. This conclusion is on a theoretical level, 
empirical there is still a lot work to be done. 
It has also been shown that auctioning fishing rights, secures that those fishermen with the highest 
valuation gets the rights. This is shown, both in a theoretical and practical way. This lead to a more efficient 
fishing fleet, which in reality, also has been the case in Estonia for instance. 
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